Interesting post, but I need to clarify one thing. Judge Griffith didn’t conclude that “policy differences were sufficient basis to trigger for-cause removal.” Instead, Judge Griffith concluded more narrowly that “inefficiency,” one of the express grounds for removal in the CFPB’s governing statute, is “only a minimal restriction on the President’s removal power, even permitting him to remove the Director for ineffective policy choices.” By contrast, the Federal Reserve Act does not provide any express protection for removing a Governor from serving as Vice Chair for Supervision, so Judge Griffith’s “inefficiency” line of reasoning is irrelevant to that question. Further, Judge Griffith’s opinion came before the Seila and Collins decisions, which the Biden administration’s OLC relied on to remove the SSA commissioner despite a “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office” removal protection in the SSA’s governing statute.
Thanks for weighing in. I stand by the post, though, in each respect. The "for cause" removal protection does apply to Governors; the WSJ editorial is aimed at removing Barr full stop (from Governor and therefore, by statute, from VCS). I think the Griffith reasoning on "inefficiency" is actually much broader than policy differences, as your quoted passage reveals: it includes ineffective policy choices and much more besides. So the line you quote from my post is correct. And Seila Law and Collins did not interpret "for cause" in places, as with the BOG, where it still applies.
Thank you, Peter, for continuing to provide such excellent analysis. It is a tremendous public service.
Thanks so much for that, Kim. It means a lot.
Interesting post, but I need to clarify one thing. Judge Griffith didn’t conclude that “policy differences were sufficient basis to trigger for-cause removal.” Instead, Judge Griffith concluded more narrowly that “inefficiency,” one of the express grounds for removal in the CFPB’s governing statute, is “only a minimal restriction on the President’s removal power, even permitting him to remove the Director for ineffective policy choices.” By contrast, the Federal Reserve Act does not provide any express protection for removing a Governor from serving as Vice Chair for Supervision, so Judge Griffith’s “inefficiency” line of reasoning is irrelevant to that question. Further, Judge Griffith’s opinion came before the Seila and Collins decisions, which the Biden administration’s OLC relied on to remove the SSA commissioner despite a “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office” removal protection in the SSA’s governing statute.
Thanks for weighing in. I stand by the post, though, in each respect. The "for cause" removal protection does apply to Governors; the WSJ editorial is aimed at removing Barr full stop (from Governor and therefore, by statute, from VCS). I think the Griffith reasoning on "inefficiency" is actually much broader than policy differences, as your quoted passage reveals: it includes ineffective policy choices and much more besides. So the line you quote from my post is correct. And Seila Law and Collins did not interpret "for cause" in places, as with the BOG, where it still applies.